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ON THE LOGIC OF INTENTIONAL HELP: 
SOME METAPHYSICAL QUESTIONS 
Roderick M. Chisholm and Dean W. Zimmerman 
In this note, we explore certain aspects of "the logic of helping"; offer an 
account of the metaphysics of helping God; and suggest a way in which 
God's help differs from human help. 
We presuppose the following thesis of natural theology: that all contingent 
beings depend for their existence upon an omniscient necessary substance. 
Our concern is to compare the ways of helping and being helped by a neces-
sary being with the ways of helping and being helped by a contingent being. 
The Logic of Helping 
From 
(a) x helps y to bring about z 
it follows that 
(b) Y helps to bring about z 
but not that 
(c) y helps x to bring about z. 
My being helped by someone to bring about some event implies an 
intentional relation between me and the event in question. Jones's help-
ing Robinson to do something implies that Robinson, at least, "knows 
what he's doing", whether or not Jones does. 
But I can unwittingly help you to do something, in which case it is 
simply not true that you helped me to do it. "The scientist-by virtue of 
his published research-helped to create the very bomb he so adamantly 
opposed." But of course the manufacturer of the bomb could not be said 
to have helped the scientist to create the bomb. If something helps y to 
bring about 2, then any individual which contributes causally to 2 is 
such that it helps y to bring about 2, but will not in general be such that 
anything helps it bring about 2. 
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If you are to help God to do something, then the event in question 
must be the result of something God does and something you do. But, 
since every contingent thing depends for its existence upon God, and 
every event depends upon His concurrence, it is unclear how you could 
make a separate causal contribution to, for example, the creation of a 
thing.! There is, however, a way in which this might happen. 
The Nature of Causation 
We assume that causation is more than "the constant conjunction of 
events" -this because of the nature of causation and also because of the 
nature of events.2 
We take as undefined the concept of a sufficient causal condition of an 
event. If an event has a sufficient causal condition, then it is an event 
that is causally determined; otherwise, it is causally undetermined. 
Any event (say, your walking) has a substrate (you) and a content 
(the property of walking). An event that is determined may have a con-
tent that is implied by the content of an undetermined event which has 
the same substrate. If your walking is causally determined, your walk-
ing in a certain direction may yet be causally undetermined. In this case, 
we could say that the event of your walking "falls under" that of your 
walking in a particular direction: 
Dl Event E falls under event H ==df the content of E is implied 
by the content of H, the content of H is not implied by the 
content of E, and E and H have the same substrate. 
For any events E and H, if E falls under H, then anything which con-
tributes causally to E also contributes causally to H. Whatever factors 
made you walk also contributed causally to your walking in a certain 
direction, even if there was not a sufficient causal condition for your 
walking in that direction. 
How One May Help God 
How, then, may you be said "to help God"? 
There are at least two ways in which this could happen. It happens if: 
(1) God causes you to perform a certain act E, and (2) E falls under an act 
that is causally undetermined. Given what we have said about causal 
contribution, any act under which E falls will be one to which God's 
action contributes causally. But in the case of a causally undetermined 
act under which E falls, you do something more than you are caused by 
God to do. 
You may also help God under the following conditions: (1) God con-
tributes causally to x-being-F, (2) some causally undetermined act of yours 
contributes causally to x-being-G, and (3) there is some H which implies 
both F and G, and x-being-H also occurs. For instance, Jones may be run-
ning swiftly to the right; God helps him run swiftly (by putting wings on 
his feet), but you make him run to the right (by calling out to him). 
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Running-swiftly-to-the-right implies both running-swiftly and running-to-the-
right. So Jones-running-to-the-right and Jones-running-swiftly are both 
parts of Jones-running-swiftly-to-the-right. Since God and you contribute 
causally to the parts, you each contribute causally to the whole. 
In what sense, then, can a parent be said to have helped God in creat-
ing the parent's child? The parent does this by performing an act that is 
causally determined and is such that it falls under an act that is not 
causally determined. What might the causally undetermined act be? It 
could be an act determining, with respect to certain properties of the 
child, that the child will have those properties. An example might be the 
event of the child's weighing so-and-so many pounds at birth. A gar-
dener could similarly help the Creator produce a plant. It is in such a 
fashion, we would say, that you might be able to help the deity. 
God's help and our help 
The way in which the deity helps us differs from the way contingent sub-
stances help us. For in the case of your being helped by another human 
being to bring about some event, it is not always the case that you help 
her to bring about that event-as we saw from the example of the scien-
tist who unwittingly helped create a bomb, but who was not helped by 
anyone to create a bomb. Since God always knows what the results of 
His actions will be, He can never contribute "unwittingly" to the occur-
rence of any event.3 Thus, whenever He helps you to bring about some 
event, it is also true that you help Him to bring about that event.4 
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3. This leads to a familiar problem of theodicy: if God knowingly helps 
us bring about injustices and evils, can we avoid attributing actions to God 
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